Theos Report on Assisted Dying

The latest report from Theos has just been published:

Andrew Grey, Dignity at the End of Life: What’s Beneath the Assisted Dying Debate? (London: Theos, 2018).

Here is the summary blurb:

‘In spite of Parliament’s emphatic rejection of a “right to die” bill in 2015, the issue of assisted dying remains a live one. Central to both sides of the debate is the idea of “dignity”. This essay examines the different meanings of the word and then outlines what an understanding of dignity as being loved and valued would look like for the terminally ill.’

As Baroness Ilora Finlay of Llandaff writes in the foreword:

‘This report… examines concepts of dignity in living, particularly in the face of deteriorating health, and develops a more informed view of what dignity really is, how it is respected and enhanced, and what it can and should look like for everyone.’

A pdf of the full report is available here.

Ethics in Brief Volume 21, Nos. 5 & 6 (2016)

Two issues from Volume 21 of Ethics in Brief, published by The Kirby Laing Institute for Christian Ethics, are now available online:

Julian Rivers

Fundamental British Values and the Virtues of Civic Loyalty

This paper reflects the rise of ‘fundamental British values’ as a core part of the Government’s counter-extremism strategy. It identifies several problems with the idea of FBVs, and suggests that we need to recover the concept of civic loyalty instead. It is appropriate to promote this through education, which should in part seek to form pupils and students into virtuous citizens.

Kirsty Jones

Dementia: Living in the Memories of God – A Review

[From the Conclusion:] Offering an original and carefully constructed theology of dementia, Memories is essential reading for academic and pastoral work on disability and anthropology. Swinton effectively shows why the church should care about people living with dementia, and how it can care well. God, he emphasises, cares because he remembers persons as they were, are and will be, holding their reality in his hands and cherishing each moment of joy and sorrow. Remembering, for God, is purposeful and powerful; his memory is the foundation of humanity and each human life. Inspired by such a vision, the book moves us cognitively beyond narrow conceptions, emotively beyond apathy, and practically into action.

Peter Saunders on George Carey on Assisted Suicide

I was interested to read this morning a piece in The Guardian reporting that George Carey, ‘former archbishop lends his support to campaign to legalise right to die’.

Having posted on previous occasions about assisted suicide (here, here, and here), I thought I’d link to this too.

Carey’s statement is available to read in The Daily Mail here.

The Times has a piece from Justin Welby (here, though you have to be a subscriber to see it online, or read page 22 of today’s newspaper), summed up in the headline: ‘Helping people to die is not truly compassionate.’

Helpfully quick off the mark is Peter Saunders on ‘Why Lord Carey is so desperately wrong about legalising assisted suicide’.

Towards the end of the piece, he writes that ‘there is no discernible Christian world view underpinning what [Carey] says’:

‘Nothing of the fact that God made us and owns us; nothing of biblical morality or the sixth commandment; no doctrine of the Fall; little insight into the depths of human depravity and the need for strong laws to deter exploitation and abuse of vulnerable people; nothing of the cross or the resurrection; no hope beyond death; nothing of courage and perseverance in the face of suffering; no recognition of the need to make one’s peace with God and others before death; no real drive to make things better for dying patients and no real empathy with the feelings of vulnerable disabled and elderly people who fear a law like Falconer’s and will be campaigning in force outside parliament next Friday.

‘Carey has instead produced a piece that is high on emotion but weak on argument that capitulates to the spirit of the age; that enthrones personal autonomy above public safety; that sees no meaning or purpose in suffering; that appears profoundly naïve about the abuse of elderly and disabled people; that looks forward to no future beyond the grave and that could have been written by  a member of the national secular society, British humanist association or voluntary euthanasia society.’

Update (13 July 2014): Justin Welby’s article from The Times is now available here.

Ethics in Brief Volume 19, Nos. 1 & 2 (2013)

Two issues from Volume 19 of Ethics in Brief, published by The Kirby Laing Institute for Christian Ethics, are now available online:

Claire Hordern, ‘Defining Death: New Pathways to Consider’, Ethics in Brief 19, 1 (2013).

By drawing on recent neurological research this article challenges some prevailing medical assumptions about the definition of death and explores some of the philosophical contours of the brain death debate.

Benjamin S. Wall, ‘Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader: Theological Contributions to Disability Discourse’, Ethics in Brief 19, 2 (2013).

Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader, edited by Brian Brock and John Swinton, is an indispensable contribution not only to the field of disability studies but also to any contemporary attempt at engaging in serious anthropological, theological, and ethical discourse. This article provides a summary sketch of the book tracing some of the issues it addresses.

Catalyst 6 (Autumn 2013)

Catalyst is a twice-yearly magazine, published by CARE, highlighting ministries ‘making a Christian difference’ as well as giving the latest CARE news.

According to CARE, this issue includes a ‘moving interview with Professor John Wyatt on human dignity, a profile of TLG Education charity, a lively account of an evaluate presentation, a tour round the Parliaments and Assemblies, and much more’.

The issue is available for browsing here, or downloadable as a pdf here.

Centre for Public Christianity (July 2013)

The latest newsletter from the Centre for Public Christianity contains links to several interesting-looking features:

• A two-part video interview with Megan Best, discussing her book, Fearfully and Wonderfully Made, which examines the ethics of reproductive medicine from a Christian perspective.

• A video interview with Vishal Mangalwadi on how the Bible that has provided the basis for the freedoms enjoyed in the west, and why he thinks those freedoms are at risk.

• A two-part audio interview with Kevin Miller, director of the documentary Hellbound, and John Dickson, Ancient Historian and CPX Director.

Christian Medical Fellowship

The Christian Medical Fellowship, formed in 1949 and currently with over 4,000 UK doctors and around 1,000 UK medical students as members, has a helpful 4-minute video introduction here (or here on its own site) to its work.

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva (and Charles C. Camosy) on After-Birth Abortion

Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Journal of Medical Ethics (2012), first published on 2 March 2012.

Charles C. Camosy, ‘Concern for Our Vulnerable Prenatal and Neonatal Children: A Brief Reply to Giubilini and Minerva’ (2012).

The short article by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva came to my attention via posts from friends on Facebook. It hasn’t even been formally published in the journal yet, and already seems to be causing a wave of consternation.

Here’s the abstract:

‘Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus’ health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.’

The authors essentially argue that ‘when circumstances occur after birth such that they would have justified abortion, what we call after-birth abortion should be permissible’. They propose to call this practice ‘after-birth abortion’, rather than ‘infanticide’, ‘to emphasise that the moral status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which ‘abortions’ in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child’, seeking to claim that ‘killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be’.

There are two reasons, they say, which, taken together, justify this claim: (1) ‘The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, neither can be considered a ‘person’ in a morally relevant sense’, and (2) ‘It is not possible to damage a newborn by preventing her from developing the potentiality to become a person in the morally relevant sense’.

On the first of those points, they argue that ‘both a fetus and a newborn certainly are human beings and potential persons, but neither is a “person” in the sense of “subject of a moral right to life”. We take “person” to mean an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her’.

And on the second of those points: ‘If a potential person, like a fetus and a newborn, does not become an actual person, like you and us, then there is neither an actual nor a future person who can be harmed, which means that there is no harm at all.’

In a brief reply to Giubilini and Minerva, Charles C. Camosy notes that the Catholic Church also makes logical connections between abortion and infanticide, but, of course differ on their views of what kind of thing the prenatal and neonatal child is. Hence, ‘the Catholic Church will part company with Giubilini and Minerva with regard to moral anthropology and in particular when they claim human persons can be defined merely as collections of actualized traits’.

‘From our prenatal and postnatal children – to brain damaged and mentally disabled adults – the fact that a fellow substance of a rational nature happens to have their potential frustrated is no reason at all to treat them as anything less than a person. If anything, those who are not currently expressing these traits deserve our special attention given that they are so vulnerable.’

Camosy notes that pro-lifers, to be serious players in public debate, ‘should hold a coherent and consistent point of view’, and so ‘should expect... to be pushed to deal with the implications of our positions which seem absurd to others’. He also decries the personal attacks and threats of violence that Giubilini and Minerva have received from those who identify as Christians.

‘That hate and vitriol are spewed by people on all sides of these controversial debates is nothing new, but Christians are called to love and solidarity even with those who oppose us on massively important issues like this. When we behave in ways which undermine our own values of love, solidarity, and respect for life, we not only fail to live the life to which Jesus called us, but we also undercut the effectiveness of our own arguments.’